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Abstract 
The Supreme Court of India acts as a Constitutional Court 
as well as the highest appellate court.  The Constitution 
imposes mandatory minimum requirements for the 
strength of the Bench for constitutional adjudication.  The 
apex Court has been criticized for constituting fewer 
number of Constitution benches, and for delaying the 
disposal of constitutional matters. Many Constitutional 
questions are being decided upon by Division benches or 
Constitutional benches, consisting of merely three 
members, due to prolific appeals in the Supreme Court.  
The researcher aims to analyze the question ‘whether the 
size of the Bench matters for constitutional adjudication?’ 
The article in the light of Constitutional provisions and 
the Supreme Court Rules, focuses on the impact of small 
and large benches, particularly in the highest Court of the 
land, where constitutional questions are decided upon. 
The Kesavananda Bharati case has been employed to 
examine the pros and cons of a large Bench, and the 
recent NJAC case is analyzed to bring out the problems of 
a smaller Bench, in overruling the decision of a larger 
Bench. The researcher therefore, attempts to answer the  
 
* Assistant Professor, SRM School of Law, SRM University, 
Kattankulathur, Tamil Nadu, India; muthukumarml@gmail.com 
 
 
Christ University Law Journal                                                   ISSN 2278-4322 
 
2 
 
question whether a minimum required strength of the 
Bench in constitutional adjudication is required for the 
organic development of constitutional jurisprudence in 
our country.   
Keywords: Article 145, Constitutional Bench, Constitution of India, 
NJAC, Supreme Court Rules. 
I. Introduction 
The most important function of the highest Court of the land is 
constitutional adjudication.  As a Constitutional Court, it interprets 
the Constitution based on the prevailing circumstances, making it a 
living document. It also exercises its power of constitutional review 
of legislative and executive actions, when they violate any 
provision(s) of the Constitution. In addition to that, it also reviews 
the Constitutional amendment(s) and keeps the basic structure of 
the Constitution intact without being harmed by the legislature. 
There exist several distinctions between the adjudication of 
ordinary matters and Constitutional matters.  It is important to 
understand the procedural requirements, besides the nuances of 
substantive processes in constitutional adjudication.  Unlike the 
United States of America, the Supreme Court of India sits in 
fragmented Benches, for disposing cases of varied subject matters.  
There is no mandatory rule imposed on the Court, to sit as a 
unified Bench or in a specified strength, to decide the cases with the 
only exception as provided under Article 145(3).   The Constitution 
permits the Supreme Court to lay down rules of procedure to hear 
appeals.1  It is a mandatory Constitutional requirement that when a 
question involves constitutional interpretation, the matter be 
decided by a Bench of not less than five judges in number.  In the 
last decade, the Supreme Court has constituted lesser number of 
Constitutional benches, and has delayed the disposal of 
Constitutional matters. Many Constitutional questions are being 
decided upon by the Division Benches consisting of merely two or 
three members, due to the increasing number of appeals to the 
Supreme Court. The former Chief Justices of India have primarily 
been concerned with the disposal of regular appeal matters to clear 
                                                          
1 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Art. 145(1). 
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the backlog and therefore, have been reluctant to constitute a five 
or more judge Benches for a single case.  Moreover, the Chief 
Justice of India is constrained to constitute two or three judge 
Benches to decide many important questions of law involving 
Constitutional interpretation, even though it is not a 
constitutionally mandated strength to decide Constitutional 
questions.2 The question that arises is, whether the size of the Bench 
matters in constitutional adjudication or will a bigger bench 
provide a more efficient outcome in constitutional adjudication. 
This article focuses on the importance of Article 145(3) of the 
Constitution of India in adjudicating constitutional questions with 
a minimum number of five judges in the Bench. 
II. Procedure and Practice for constituting Constitutional 
Benches 
By virtue of Article 145 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme 
Court of India can regulate the procedure as regards to constitution 
and composition of the Benches for different matters, besides 
making formal rules and guidelines regulating practice and 
procedure in the Court. However, Article 145(3) casts a mandatory 
duty on the Supreme Court to constitute a Bench of minimum five 
judges, who are expected to sit for the purpose of deciding any case 
involving a substantial question of law, such as the interpretation 
of the Constitution. Further, Order VI of the Supreme Court Rules, 
2013 provides for ‘constitution of division courts and powers of a 
single judge’.3  Order VI Rule 2 states that ‘where in the course of 
the hearing of any cause, appeal or other proceeding, the Bench 
(two judge) considers that the matter should be dealt with by a 
larger Bench, it shall refer the matter to the Chief Justice, who shall 
thereupon constitute such a Bench for the hearing of it.’  The rule 
prohibits a vacation judge sitting singly during vacation, from 
entertaining applications for special leave to appeal in urgent cases, 
where interim relief is prayed for. However, when such a petition 
                                                          
2 Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263; Suresh Kumar Koushal v. 
NAZ Foundation & Ors. (2014) 1 SCC 1; Nandini Sundar & Ors v. State of 
Chattisgarh (2011)7 SCC 547. 
3 The Supreme Court Rules, 2013, O. VI. 
Christ University Law Journal                                                   ISSN 2278-4322 
 
4 
 
raises substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the 
Constitution, the Bench can entertain an application under Article 
32 of the Constitution. In case it involves a substantial question of 
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, then rule nisi alone 
should be issued.  Similarly, Rule 1 and Rule 2 of Order XXXVIII, 
which deal with the applications for enforcement of fundamental 
rights (Article 32 of the Constitution) also, contain provisions to 
that effect.4 
III. Whether Structure of the Court matters in constitutional 
adjudication 
The structure of legislative decision making, receives great 
attention, but legal commentators rarely consider how judicial 
structure might affect the quality of decision making.5 There is no 
definitive answer to the question of how large the highest Court of 
the land should be and the structure it should possess in handling 
constitutional cases. The structure of the highest Court in every 
country varies according to its suitability to the country’s legal 
system.  The Court may sit as a multi-panel or en banc, for cases 
pertaining to matters relating to the Constitution or otherwise.  The 
functioning of multi-panel Courts in the United Kingdom (both 
House of Lords and now, the Supreme Court),Canada (the 
Supreme Court of Canada) are similar to that of India.  Unlike 
India, certain Courts sit en banc, such as the Supreme Court of the 
United States of America, Constitutional Court of South Africa, and 
Supreme Federal Court of Brazil.  Undoubtedly, the success of any 
Court in performing its tasks depends on the particulars of its 
institutional design in a large way and its overall image as a 
guardian institution, is fostered by its structure.6 The Court is 
widely perceived as a group of apolitical judicial experts who can 
                                                          
4 The Supreme Court Rules, 2013, O. XXXVIII. 
5  Michael B. Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 
(2000). 
6 F. Andrew Hessick and Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the size of the Supreme 
Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645, 647 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian 
Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 920 (2003). 
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be relied upon when other branches of the state fail.  Its large size 
gives the Court an almost impersonal nature that helps foster a 
sense of expertise, even though its ability to take on many cases 
creates a more populist image at the same time.  All of these 
characteristics are affected by the panel structure of the Court to 
varying extents.7 
IV. Court with Large and Small Numbers 
There are varied arguments put forth by several authors 
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of having Courts 
with large and small numbers.  A prominent argument against 
Courts with large numbers is that participation among the judges 
becomes difficult.  Judge Posner explains: ‘....when the number of 
judges reaches the level, conventionally taken to nine, beyond 
which the deliberations of a Court come increasingly to resemble 
those of a legislature.’8 Thus, he believes that Courts will become a 
deliberative body like the legislature and will find it difficult to 
arrive at a solution within a time frame.  While deciding 
constitutional matters, the Court shall efficiently and expediently 
handle it, rendering the decision to be transparent and reflecting 
the participation of all members with coherence and accuracy. An 
analysis of the same can be made by comparing the size of the 
Court and its impact based on the categories mentioned below: 
 A. Decisions that are efficient and expedite: Expanding the Court 
may expedite the decision of a case.  But, more judges mean that 
more opinions may be worked on at once.  This may lead to the 
increase in delays.  Increased collegiality should yield greater 
efficiency because norms of productivity and group commitment 
enhance group performance. Active participation of individual 
judges may decrease as the bench gets larger, with members 
                                                          
7 Nick Robinson, Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the 
Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts, (Dec. 20, 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061061. 
8 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND 
REFORM 133 (Harvard University Press 1999); Supra note 7 at 1623. 
Christ University Law Journal                                                   ISSN 2278-4322 
 
6 
 
perceiving their contributions as not significant.9 Hence, minority 
views are expressed less and fewer dissenting opinions may be 
rendered.  This effect is not necessarily connected to a loss of 
collegiality, but to diminished efficiency. 
B. Transparency in decision making: Impartiality is an important 
aspect of transparency.  While increasing the Court’s size may help 
reduce the impact of prejudices, there is still a likelihood of 
partiality because each individual carries his or her own set of 
biases which may adversely affect decision making.  Enlarging the 
bench may hinder deliberation, which results in each judge feeling 
less obliged to reconsider their own biases because of a belief that 
biases will have less impact given the larger Court.  Expansion also 
presents the possibility of strengthening the effect of bias.10 Shared 
biases may become stronger due to group polarization, especially if 
no other judge holds a strong opposing view.11  Increasing the size 
of the Court will enhance judicial independence i.e. less direct 
interference and influence by Government and interest groups, or 
indirect influence by the press. However, excess independence may 
strip the judges of any accountability.12 
C. Participation: Participation increases with diversity, 
representation and collegiality.  Benches of larger sizes require 
additional resources.13 More importantly, size may have a direct 
effect on the Court’s ability to satisfy the demands of the strong 
participation claim.  Smaller groups tend to produce greater levels 
of participation.14 A Bench with large numbers has greater diversity 
                                                          
9 A. Paul Hare, A study of Interaction and Consensus in Different Sized Groups, 
17 AM. SOC. REV. 261, 267 (1952). 
10 Hessick & Jordan, supra note 6 at 674. 
11 Id., 675. 
12  John A. Ferejohn and Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent 
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 
981(2002); MACLAY, W., BOWLING, K. R., & VEIT, H. E., THE DIARY OF 
WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES, (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1988) 
13 Hessick & Jordan, supra note 6 at 688. 
14 Id. 
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and representation. Greater diversity on the bench may increase the 
public trust in the Court because it may convey a sense of inclusion 
to demographic groups that would otherwise be unrepresented on 
the Court, and this sense of inclusion may in turn generate greater 
public confidence in the court. Further, it increases the diversity of 
information and viewpoints held by the judges and will increase 
the total information on the bench, which will lead to more 
informed and better decisions.15 This indicates that a large Court is 
likely to produce greater diversity, and more diverse groups enjoy 
significant advantages in solving complex problems.16 However, a 
large Court does not guarantee the presence of more informational 
perspectives. If a Court is large and homogenous, then it has 
adverse effects in decisional output.   For example, demographic 
diversity can restrict group deliberation by raising communication 
barriers and by triggering stereotyping.17 These barriers increase as 
group sizes expand, because larger groups have a greater tendency 
to break down into smaller self-segregated groups.18 Thus, even if a 
large number produces gain in both demographic and 
informational diversity, group performance may nonetheless suffer 
if the barriers created make it more difficult for the group to 
communicate and integrate informational inputs.19  One of the 
biggest obstacles in achieving the benefits of diversity is 
ineffectiveness in extracting and integrating competing 
perspectives from group members.  The significance of that 
obstacle is sensitive to the group size because average member 
participation tends to decline and the number of non-participants 
                                                          
15 Id., at 655. 
16 Richard O. Lempert, Uncovering ‘Nondiscernible’ Differences: Empirical 
Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643, 685 (1975). 
17 Harry T. Edwards, The effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1669 (2003).   
18 Robert M. Bray, Norbert L. Kerr & Robert S. Atkin, Effects of Group Size, 
Problem Difficulty, and Sex on Group Performance and Member Reactions, 36 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1224, 1233-34 (1978). 
19 Hessick and Jordan, supra note 6 at 682. 
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tends to rise, as groups get larger.20  This is because larger groups 
present fewer opportunities to speak, with the more aggressive 
members tending to seize those opportunities.21 However, many of 
the obstacles that develop in larger groups may be counteracted 
through collegiality.22 Thus, collegial groups are better at 
promoting participation by all members, at avoiding stereotyping 
and communication breakdowns that can accompany demographic 
diversifications.23 Similarly, effective leaders can structure 
deliberation to encourage greater participation and foster 
commitment to shared values about the group’s goals. However, it 
has to be noted, that both collegiality and leadership become more 
difficult to achieve as the size increases.24 Similarly size and 
collegiality may both affect the coherence of large group decisions.  
A larger group, particularly one that has a more diverse range of 
informational or value perspectives, is less likely to reach decisions 
that are agreed upon by the entire group, and the lack of consensus 
may have a negative impact on its coherence. Similarly, an increase 
in informational diversity may generate incoherence. The presence 
of multiple opinions in a given case may have adverse effects, if the 
fractured nature of the decision generates confusion about its 
precise contours.25 Although, in participation, large numbers have 
some disadvantages, it carries more weight both in precedent value 
and in the authority of the judgment, in the eyes of the public.26 The 
large numbers may also discipline decisions of the small judge 
panels by setting precedential consistency and certainty in the law.    
                                                          
20 Bray, Kerr & Atkin, supra note 18. 
21 BOBBY R. PATTON & KIM GIFFIN, DECISION-MAKING GROUP 
INTERACTION 73 (Longman Higher Education, 2nd ed., 1978). 
22 Edwards, supra note 17, 1641.  
23 Norbert L. Kerr & R. Scott Tindale, Group Performance and Decision 
Making, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 623, 626 (2004). 
24 Edwards, supra note 17, 1675.  
25 Id., at 1651. 
26 Robinson, supra note 7, at 120. 
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D. Accuracy: In large numbers, the values associated with 
promoting high quality deliberation are collegiality, informational 
diversity, impartiality, participation, etc. are favoured largely 
because they promise to deliver a constructive exchange of 
opinions and perspectives that will generate superior and more 
accurate decisions.27 If a large number of judges consider a 
particular case, then the resulting majority decision will by 
definition be that of the majority of all judges. On the contrary, if 
just one judge is selected to resolve the case, the judge might not 
produce the same decision.28 There may be more straightforward 
relationships between size and accuracy. Accuracy might be 
promoted not through the productive interaction of views, but 
through their simple aggregation.29 Under an aggregation model, 
high quality deliberation or indeed, deliberation of any kind is 
unnecessary.30  Instead, accuracy is derived from pooling together 
the individually held views of group members.31  Perhaps, the most 
well-known aggregation claim is the Condorcet Jury Theorem 
(hereinafter ‘CJT’).32  In general terms, CJT holds that if a decision 
has to be made between two choices, one correct and one incorrect 
and if all those who vote on the decision are more likely than not to 
make the correct choice, and if each votes independently of the 
others, then the probability that the majority of voters will make 
the correct choice increases. Kornhauser and Sagar assume initially 
that there are only two possible outcomes, that the judges who 
decide independently are likely to choose the correct outcome, and 
that each judge tends to choose the correct than the incorrect 
outcome.  They argue that, under these conditions, adding judges 
                                                          
27 Hessick and Jordan, supra note 6, at 693. 
28 Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 1633. 
29 Lewis A Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 
YALE L. J. 82, 99-102 (1986). 
30 Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 21 (2009). 
31 Id., at 6. 
32 Kornhauser and Sager, supra note 29, at 97-98 
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to a decision increases the likelihood of an accurate decision.33 
Hessick and Jordan discussed the problem governed by CJT by 
relying on Adrian Vermeule’s work.34  Firstly, in its classic form, 
the Theorem applies to situations where there is an exogenously 
defined correct answer. Even if we assume that right answers are 
possible in law, exogenously defined correct answers are present 
only in some subset of cases, namely those, where one of the 
following conditions is met: (1) there is a factual component to the 
legal question; (2) there is a prescriptive or means-end judgment 
about which legal ruling will be conducive in achieving an agreed-
upon goal; (3) the legal question, although neither factual nor 
prescriptive, otherwise has a right answer somehow defined 
through philosophy, morality, or contemporary culture.  No doubt, 
a substantial number of cases do not fall within these categories; 
they do not have ‘right’ answers.  For them, the Theorem does not 
hold.  Secondly, even for those cases where the condition of an 
exogenously defined correct answer is satisfied, there is a potential 
barrier associated with the requirement of independence.  The 
cause for concern is not deliberation, but correlated bias.  Random 
distribution of bias is a major force behind the Jury Theorem, but 
sometimes they are likely to err in the systematic rather than 
random ways and these errors will undercut group performance.35 
All of this connects to size and the theorem in the following way.  If 
background diversity is absent, then even a very large group may 
not satisfy the requirements of the Theorem, and it becomes more 
difficult to support a claim for increased size as a means of 
promoting accuracy.  If background diversity is present, then the 
conditions for the Theorem may be met for some number of the 
                                                          
33 Benjamin R.D. Alarie, et al., Is Bigger Always Better? On Optimal Panel 
Size, with Evidence from the Supreme Court of Canada, SSRN, (May, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm? abstract_id 
=1152322.  
34Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2007). 
35 Id., at 1500-01. 
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Court’s cases, and an expansion in size should increase the 
likelihood that the correct results are reached in those cases.36 
The above vitiating elements of a large Bench can be well 
illustrated by the case of Kesavananda BharatiSripadagalavaru v. State 
of Kerala,37 (hereinafter Kesavananda case) which was the only case 
decided by the thirteen judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India.  
It was a landmark constitutional battle between the Parliament and 
the Supreme Court concerning the power of the Parliament to 
amend the Constitution.   From day one, the Court witnessed lots 
of interesting outcomes both from the Bench and the Bar.  
Although, the judges were carefully selected by the CJI, it was 
equally divided for and against the Government.38  The advocates 
made their arguments before the judges who were inclined to their 
view and not before those having conflicting views.  Further, if any 
question posed by one of the judges is answered by another judge 
in the Bench either in favour or against the Government, it causes 
great embarrassment not only to the remaining judges sitting in the 
Bench, but also the advocates who are arguing the case. This lead to 
several heated debates and indecisive arguments in the Court. 
During the course of the arguments, Justice Beg became ill often, 
which detached him from the Bench and left him hospitalized 
when final arguments were advanced.  Thus, the hospitalisation of 
Justice Beg hampered expediting the case and left the advocate 
with no other option but to submit the arguments in writing. 
Moreover, the retirement of Chief Justice Sikri, the very next day of 
the date of judgment, compelled the advocates to close their 
arguments early.  In addition to that, some judges had no time to 
read all the eleven judgments as they were prepared under great 
constraints of time. Justice Chandrachud confessed that he just had 
time to scan through four draft judgments of his colleagues. 
                                                          
36 Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A statistical Study of 
Judicial Qualtiy, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711, 717-718 (2000). 
37 AIR 1973 SC 1461; (1973) 4 SCC 225. 
38 T.R. Andhyarujina, Basic structure of the Constitution revisited, THE 
HINDU, (May 21, 2007), available at http://www. thehindu. com /todays-
paper/tp-opinion/basic-structure-of-the-constitution-
revisited/article1845048.ece. 
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Although, the Bench was large with diverse views, the decision 
was affected by lack of participation by all members of the Bench 
and collegiality.  There was not enough deliberation between the 
Justices to know the views of the brother judges and at times, Chief 
Justice Sikri called for a meeting but only with like-minded 
Judges.39  The act of the CJI showed a failure in encouraging greater 
participation of all members of the Bench in order to arrive at a 
precise and coherent decision. After the pronouncement of the 
eleven judgements in Court, the conclusion could not be reached 
due to lack of consensus. This compelled CJI Sikri to produce a 
paper titled the ‘view of the majority’ and obtain signatures of all 
13 judges. One of the conclusions was that ‘Parliament did not have 
the power to amend the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.’ 
This was extracted from Justice H.R. Khanna’s judgement. Nine 
judges signed the statement in the Court. Four others refused to 
sign it. A reading of the eleven judgments would show that this 
conclusion could not have been the view of the majority. The 
‘doctrine of basic structure’ was born out of the views of one judge, 
Justice H.R. Khanna. The Chief Justice’s action has been described 
by some as an act of statesmanship and others believe it was a 
manoeuvre to create a majority that did not exist. Thus, although it 
was a large Bench, the partial attitude of the Chief Justice allowed 
the controversial doctrine to be formulated. 
However, there are certain disadvantages in small numbers as they 
cannot overrule the decision of larger benches.  This is evident from 
the Supreme Court Advocates On-Record Association and others v. 
Union of India and others40 (hereinafter NJAC case).  In the said case, 
three Orders were passed, the first dealt with the recusal of one of 
the Judges, the second, a ‘Reference Order’ and the third, an Order 
on merits. Concerning the Order of reference, the Supreme Court 
held that the collegium system governed by the second and third 
judges cases, (Supreme Court Advocates-on Record Association v. 
Union of India 1993 and Re Special Reference 1 of 1998 
                                                          
39 T.R. ANDHYARUJINA, KESAVANANDA BHARATI CASE: THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY BY SUPREME 
COURT AND PARLIAMENT 70 (Universal Law Publishing Co., 2011). 
40 (2015) 6 SCC 408. 
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respectively) would become a historical event of the past, as the 
new scheme contemplated under the impugned Constitution (99th 
Amendment) Act, along with the NJAC Act, would replace the 
earlier dispensation.41  In the above eventuality, the question of re-
examination of the second and third judges’ cases would be only 
academic. The court further held that ‘however, if we accept the 
submissions of the petitioners, resulting in the revival of the earlier 
process, and simultaneously conclude in favour of the respondents, that 
the second and third Judges cases need a re-look, we would be obliged to 
refer this matter to a nine Judge Bench (or even, to a larger Bench), for re-
examining the judgments rendered in the second and third Judges case.’42  
The majority judgement in this case favoured the petitioners but 
simultaneously found issues in the memorandum of procedure 
adopted by the collegiums, but not in the collegium itself found by 
the second Judges’ case and confirmed in the third Judges’ cases.  
Moreover, although the issue is a new one as held by the Court in 
this case, it heavily relied upon the judgements of the second and 
third judges’ cases for their reasoning.  This is because the Bench of 
lesser strength and judicial propriety has to follow the decision of a 
larger Bench.  Further, the CJI can easily pick the smaller benches, 
which in turn can be tutored to the needs and circumstances.  In 
this context, it is significant to mention the powers and functions of 
CJI in constituting Constitution Benches in India.   
V. Role of Chief Justice in Constituting Constitution 
Benches 
As per the normal practice, the Registrar (Judicial) prepares the 
roster for the Court’s business and with the approval of the Chief 
Justice, the cause-lists are prepared showing matters assigned to 
various benches of judges.43 However, the Chief Justice can modify 
                                                          
41Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441; 
Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, (1998) 7 SCC 739. 
42 Supreme Court Advocates On-Record Association & Ors v. Union of 
India & Ors, available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/ FileServer/ 
2015-10-16_1444997560.pdf. 
43 VIJAY K. GUPTA, DECISION MAKING IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
INDIA: A JURIMETRIC STUDY 97 (Kaveri Books, 1995). 
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or change the cause list, if he so desires and can override the 
automated system of assigning cases and explicitly assign cases to 
his own or another’s bench.  It is clear that he plays a strong role 
not only in deciding which cases are heard by larger benches, but 
also cases heard by other judges.44 The bench assignments are not 
made randomly or by lottery, nor are they made by some rotation 
formula, which might restrict the Chief Justice’s discretion.  The 
period from 1950 to 1967, has provided evidence pointing to the 
conclusion that at least several of the Chief Justices of that period 
made bench assignments with a view towards achieving decisions 
and policy outputs they preferred. This was primarily done to 
maximize unanimity and minimize dissent.45 Further, he can speed 
up the hearing of cases or withhold a politically sensitive case, for 
years. He also creates the composition of benches that can 
effectively punish judges for outlier decisions. For example, he can 
place a non-conforming judge on a two judge bench or not include 
them on the larger and more powerful constitution benches of five 
or more judges.46 In the All India Law Teachers Conference, held 
on Dec. 27, 1979, at Varanasi, Hon’ble Justice Bhagwati, a member 
of the Court since 1973, made a different but pertinent point 
concerning the prerogative power of the Chief Justice in choosing 
the bench to decide a constitutional matter.47 Thus, the practices 
clearly show that bench assignments in the Supreme Court are 
exclusive prerogative of the Chief Justice and he enjoys 
considerable discretion in these matters. There is no express 
provision or procedure governing the bench assignments, but there 
are a number of factors which may be relevant in making bench 
assignments. They range from utilization of the judges’ strength 
with a view to maximise the decisional output of the Court, effort 
to minimise overt dissent in the Court, where unanimity is a 
preferred value with the Chief Justice, and consideration like 
                                                          
44 H.R. KHANNA, NEITHER ROSES NOR THORNS 77 (Eastern Book 
Co., 1987).  
45 George Gadbois, Participation In Supreme Court Decision Making: From 
Kania To Vaidialingam, 1950-1967, 24 JILI (1982). 
46 Robinson, supra note 7 at 115. 
47 Supra note at 45. 
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subject matter specialisation of judges or their interest in a 
particular area of the law to ideological preferences and their 
probable voting response in important controversies.48 Court 
packing is made easy by the Government either through the Chief 
Justice of the Court or directly through small Benches.  
VI. Determination of the optimal size of ‘Five Judge’ Bench 
for Constitutional adjudication 
It is pertinent to analyse the deliberations of the members in the 
Constituent Assembly, in fixing not less than ‘five judges’ for 
constitutional adjudication as the ‘best’ ordering for setting the size 
of the Court. On June 6, 1949, Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar 
moved Art. 145(3) and clause (2)(a) of Art. 121. He did not make 
any comment over this provision because it speaks for itself, but 
spoke about the proviso, so as to save the time of the Court.49 Dr. 
Ambedkar accorded whole hearted support to Shri. Alladi 
Krishnaswami Ayyar, on the condition that the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court extends to criminal matters as well.50  Thus, there 
was no deliberation and difference of opinion among the members 
in fixing the minimum of five Judges to hear substantial question of 
law, as to the interpretation of the Constitution.   Moreover, there is 
no view expressed that the Supreme Court has to sit en banc as like 
the Supreme Court of the United States. The founding fathers of the 
Constitution had consciously thought that the large number will 
pose great problems, resulting in the Court sitting with just eight 
judges including the Chief Justice. This precedent was also 
followed by the Supreme Court also en banc in the year 1950.  
However, due to accumulation of cases, it started to sit in benches 
of five, six and three. The Supreme Court Rules, 1950, provided 
                                                          
48 Robinson, supra note 7 at 98; Chaitanya Kalbag, A Battle Supreme, INDIA 
TODAY, (August 27, 2013) ,available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/ 
story/more-hostile-public-confrontations-between-supreme-court-judges-
feared-in-the-future/1/392350.html 
49 Statement of Shri. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, Constituent Assembly of 
India, Vol. VIII, 644-645 (June 6, 1949). 
50 Constituent Assembly of India, Vol. VIII, 650 (June 6, 1949).  
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that at least three judges had to participate in every decision. But, 
with the widening jurisdiction, they could not continue the tempo 
of sitting in large number not even a three Judge Bench.  The rule 
was amended very early to permit two Judge Benches.   
VII. Conclusion 
Ascertaining the Bench size is easier said than done. It is difficult to 
determine what size would maximize any particular benefit in 
isolation. A group of three or four judges might for instance, 
maximize the benefits of deliberation, but a group of seven or nine 
might maximize accuracy. More importantly, setting a size to 
achieve one goal might undermine another. Conversely, reducing 
Court size to obtain effective participation, efficiency, and 
coherence, may impede diversity. Thus, how we set the size 
therefore depends on how we prioritize the goals of the Court. 
Undoubtedly, our Supreme Court has been vested with vast 
jurisdictions.  It exercises original, appellate and advisory 
jurisdiction and the strength of the Bench becomes five or more, if 
any of the cases that arise in the above jurisdiction contains a 
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the 
Constitution.  In connection to it, the pros and cons of the large and 
small benches have been analyzed with the help of the Kesavananda 
case.51Although, it is a celebrated judgment in the Constitutional 
history of India, the proceedings of the case were not sacrosanct. 
The partisan attitudes of certain Judges and even advocates, both 
inside and outside  the Court, during the hearing of this case, 
shows the lack of independence of the Court. Besides the partisan 
attitude, the structure of the Court that is, a large Bench can cause 
unproductive outcomes because of lack of effective participation 
and collegiality, which directly affects the transparent nature of the 
Court.  It is clear from this case that judges should not get 
personally attached with the issue at hand and should also refrain 
from mobilizing the opinion of other judges. 
Although the framers of the Constitution had not deliberated more 
on Art. 145(3) of the Constitution, it is clear from the analysis that 
                                                          
51 Keshavananada Bharti, AIR 1973 SC 1461. 
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the five judge Bench arrived under Art. 145(3), as a minimum 
required strength for constitutional adjudication, is neither large 
nor small and is the optimal size.  Moreover, the size of the Bench 
for constitutional adjudication has remained without any serious 
mishap, for almost sixty five years.  Reassessing and perhaps 
changing the current size of the Constitution Bench by means of 
practice or by implied procedure, by reducing it to three for 
hearing important constitutional questions will create obstacles in 
promoting consistency and certainty in law. Thus, the compromise 
made in the application of Art. 145(3), for the purpose of clearing 
backlog of ordinary appeals  will impair the organic development 
of Constitutional jurisprudence in India. 
 
